The concept of freedom, order, equality and power playing out in the Flat world discussed by Tom Friedman?

Mushafau Ade Kukoyi
Harv Bishop
Political Science
09-29-05


The concept of freedom, order, equality and power playing out in the Flat world discussed by Tom Friedman?

The notions of freedom, order, equality and power in a group are precisely defined in terms of individual exertions of influence or power. Freedom is discussed in the translation of freedom from influence rather than in the form of freedom to do what one wants. It is shown that at the ideal conceptual level, complete freedom implies equality. In the situation whereby certain privileges are ascribed to certain members of the same society and others are denied the same, it will be very wrong to think equality and order can rule in such society. For example “the conceal and carry law, passed on may 28, 2003, established that local sheriff had to issue permits for anyone- other than those with felony records or declared mental ill- who requested to carry concealed firearms to work (unless the person’s employer explicitly restrict that right)”(pg. 371) is a gross violation of the right of those excluded from this privilege.

This decision did not provide for the welfare of all the people that can be directly or indirectly affected by the consequences of such law. Furthermore, the law empowers certain members’ o f the community to conceal and carry firearms and restrained people with felony record despite the fact that they have done their time for such offence in the past. Recent views of the quality of political systems focus on different aspects or dimensions expressed by terms like freedom, equality, solidarity, human rights and welfare.

The book also mentions the great contrast between 11/9 versus 9/11. In the first instance the creative imagination of 11/9 and the destructive imagination of 9/11. A person cannot perform materially impossible actions, whether she wants to do so or not. Additional to this first restraint, free will to do is further narrowed down by other people’s influence making materially possible actions impossible. Under this viewpoint, if the domains of material possibility depend on the level of welfare then the level of materially possible freedom, i.e. freedom that would prevail in the presence of freedom from influence, is higher in states with a higher level of welfare.

However, this distinction does not seem to be fruitful for in reality the `material' level and the level of influence are heavily dependent on each other. For instance, a rise of the level of welfare usually is accompanied by increased suffering of exertions of power so that the overall freedom `to do' of a person does not increase (or even decreases) when welfare does. Moreover, freedom `to do' allows for ideal, individualistic realization of freedom- I simply cut down my wants in order to become completely free (as the Hegelian slave). This shows that freedom `to do' is not well suited for discussions of essentially social matters like the comparison of political systems, and that freedom `from' is the right notion to be used in such contexts.


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